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Abstract  
Innovative, high-technology industries are commonly described as drivers of regional 
development. ‘Tech’ workers earn high wages, but they allegedly generate knock-on effects 
throughout the local economies that host them, producing new jobs and raising wages in 
nontradable activities. At the same time, in iconic high-tech agglomerations like the San 
Francisco Bay Area, the home of Silicon Valley, the success of the tech industry creates tensions, 
in part as living costs rise beyond the reach of many non-tech workers. Across a large sample 
of US cities, this paper explores these issues systematically. Combining annual data on wages, 
employment and prices from the Quarterly Census of Employment and Wages, the Department 
of Housing and Urban Development and the Consumer Price Index, it estimates how growth in 
tradable tech employment affects the real, living-cost deflated wages of local workers in 
nontradable sectors. Results indicate that high-technology employment has significant, positive, 
but substantively modest effects on the real wages of workers in nontradable sectors. However, 
in cities with highly price-inelastic housing markets, the relationship is inverted, with tech 
generating negative externalities for nontradable workers.  
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1. Introduction 
Innovative, high-technology industries are commonly believed to drive regional development, 
and it is equally commonplace for policymakers to expend effort to attract them to their localities 
(Clark, 1972; Duranton, 2011). ‘Tech’ workers command high wages, and as such their presence 
contributes to regional prosperity. Above and beyond this direct effect, tech industries are 
thought to generate wider economic benefits in the local economies that host them. Durable 
employment growth in tech and other tradable sectors raises demand for local nontradable 
services, such as health care, restaurants and dry cleaners. Higher demand for nontradables 
can be expressed through job creation as well as higher pay. Since tech work is more highly 
remunerated than many other tradables, indirect benefits from tech ought to be comparatively 
large. Still, some dark clouds hang over this sunny-seeming picture. Most notably, cities hosting 
larger concentrations of skilled workers in tech and other activities have also witnessed faster 
growth in local prices (Shapiro, 2006; Florida 2017). Studies of the most iconic technology 
clusters in the U.S. highlight the deleterious effects of rising costs, especially housing, on 
workers whose jobs support tech and other traded sectors (Schafran, 2013; Hyra, 2015). This 
work questions the narrative that tech employment generates outcomes that are “unambiguously 
positive” (Moretti and Thulin, 2013, p.343). 
 
Motivated by this debate, this paper aims to better understand the relationship between tech and 
the welfare of workers in local nontradable sectors. More specifically, it answers three questions 
related to the causal effects of local changes in employment in tradable high-technology activities. 
First, across a large sample of US cities, how do changes in local high-technology employment 
affect the real (cost-deflated) wages of workers in nontradable sectors? Second, in terms of its 
association with the real wages earned by nontradable sector employees, is tech employment 
distinct from other tradable activities? Third, by limiting housing price increases, does the 
elasticity of local housing supply moderate the relationship between tech employment and 
nontradable real wages? 
 
To answer these questions, we make use of information from the Quarterly Census of 
Employment and Wages (QCEW), which offers comprehensive longitudinal data on employment 
and wages by industry for units as small as counties. We identify our relationship of interest by 
estimating how annual changes in tradable employment in metropolitan areas are associated 
with changes in the real wages of local workers in nontradable activities, with locational and time 
fixed effects absorbing bias from unobserved city-specific, and general dynamic factors, 
respectively.1 To enable this approach, we require measures of real income and housing supply 
elasticity, as well as clean distinctions between tech and other industries. We classify each 4-
                                                 
1
 Throughout the paper, unless otherwise specified, we use terms like ‘regional,’ ‘urban,’ ‘local,’ and ‘city’ 
interchangeably to refer to functionally-integrated metropolitan areas, defined by the U.S. Census Bureau as 
Metropolitan Core-Based Statistical Areas (CBSAs). 
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digit NAICS industry into one of three categories: tech tradable, non-tech tradable or nontradable. 
To do so we use locational Gini coefficients to estimate the geographic ubiquity of each industry, 
on the assumption that tradable sectors will be relatively concentrated in space. Within tradables, 
we follow the strictest guidance from the Bureau of Labor Statistics (BLS) on what constitutes 
high-technology. We build annual local consumer price indices that combine median rent 
information from the Department of Housing and Urban Development (HUD) with non-housing 
prices from the BLS’ CPI-U, and use these as a deflator to capture location-specific real wages. 
To measure the moderating effect of the elasticity of housing supply, we interact tech 
employment with Saiz’ (2010) index of geographic land availability and, separately, with 
Gyourko’s (2008) CBSA-level estimates of the Wharton Index of Land Use Regulation (WRLURI). 
 
Our paper contributes to three active areas of research. First, and most directly, it engages with 
a long-running debate about the local development effects of high-technology and other tradable 
activities. Much of this work has focused on impacts that flow directly from local specialization in 
tech activities (Malecki, 1981; Glaeser et al, 1992; Kemeny and Storper, 2015). Meanwhile, 
nearly all studies examining wider, indirect effects consider only job creation as an outcome (i.e., 
Moretti, 2010, Van Dijk, 2016). Only a few studies consider wage impacts (i.e., Lee and 
Rodriguez-Pose, 2016), and these ignore variation in local prices. We contribute in a few specific 
ways. Ours is the first known study that measures the role of tradable sectors in shaping location-
specific real wages; that distinguishes between tradable tech, tradable non-tech, and 
nontradable activities; and that models potential heterogeneity across markets facing different 
housing constraints.  A second stream of related research is concerned with the turn towards 
growing income inequality within and between cities (Drennan et al, 1996; Moretti, 2012; Breau 
et al, 2014; Ganong and Shoag, 2017). Recent work shows that tech and other high-skill workers 
have increasingly sorted into more expensive cities (Shapiro, 2006; Diamond, 2016). While this 
spatial stratification reduces real wage inequality at a national scale (Moretti, 2013b), it also 
implies growing precariousness of workers in nontradable activities who have not sorted to low-
cost locations – precisely the barbers, dry cleaners and health care workers whose services tech 
workers consume. This paper is the first known attempt to examine the links between tech and 
the welfare of this population of workers in a direct and systematic way   Third, and most loosely, 
this paper contributes to sociological accounts of the role of tech employment in generating 
neighborhood change. Existing work has considered themes of displacement, changes in the 
consumption landscape and other topics, often at a relatively small spatial scale and largely 
inside iconic hubs of tech activity (Solnit, 2002; Centner, 2008; Stehlin, 2016). The present paper 
complements this work by adding a more regional perspective, a more systematic approach, 
and a wider frame in terms of the range of cities considered. 
 
In brief, we find that regional growth in tech tradables is positively related to growth in real wages 
for workers in nontradable sectors. However, the overall relationship is relatively modest: an 
increase of one thousand tech workers increases the annual real wages of workers in 
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nontradable activities by approximately $20. By contrast, non-tech tradable employment is 
unrelated to the real wages of workers in nontradables. Additionally, as theory predicts, we 
conclude that the real wage effects of tech employment depend on local housing supply, and in 
those locations where the supply of housing is highly inelastic, the relationship between tech 
sector growth and nontradable wages is negative. This suggests that, in tight housing markets, 
the wider benefits of high-tech are reallocated from workers to incumbent landowners. 
 
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows. In Section 2 we review the literature linking 
high-technology employment to development outcomes, focusing especially on theory and 
empirics regarding the indirect effects of this relationship on workers in nontradable sectors. 
Section 3 describes our empirical approach, while Section 4 discusses data and measurement 
issues. Section 5 presents our findings, and Section 6 concludes. 
 
2. Literature Review 
Innovative, high-technology activities have long enjoyed a privileged position in the minds of 
researchers and policymakers concerned with economic development (Clark, 1972; Malecki, 
1981; Scott and Storper, 1987; Duranton and Puga, 2001; Howells, 2005; Block and Keller, 
2009; Storper et al., 2015; Feldman et al., 2016).  Nonroutine high-technology activities tend to 
be strongly localized in space, as firms and workers congregate to match with each other and to 
efficiently produce and exchange tacit knowledge (Storper and Walker, 1989; Glaeser et al, 
1992; Saxenian, 1994; Chatterji et al, 2014).  
The increasing importance of high-technology goods and services has stimulated job growth in 
these activities, whether through the expansion of existing firms or the birth of new ventures. 
The growth of this sector can have direct and indirect effects on the localities that play host to it. 
First and most obviously, it will expand the local employment base. And as workers in high-
technology industries tend to be well paid, growth in tech employment is likely to increase local 
per capita incomes. Such direct income effects can be large. At the extreme, consider the tech 
boom of 1994-2000. Over this period, Galbraith and Hale (2004) demonstrate that the California 
counties of San Mateo, Santa Clara and San Francisco (all in the San Francisco Bay Area that 
contains Silicon Valley), as well Washington’s Kings County (home to Microsoft and Amazon) 
together accounted for nearly all the growth in between-county income inequality. 
 
The indirect effects of tech employment are subtler. To understand them, we must first 
distinguish between tradable and nontradable economic activity. Tradable goods are those 
produced to serve national, and potentially global markets, and as such face prices that are not 
defined locally. Many such activities are subject to internal or external increasing returns to scale 
in production, and consequently will tend towards some degree of geographic concentration. 
Some are so concentrated that their locations have come to represent them metonymically, such 
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as Hollywood, Wall Street, and of course Silicon Valley. Meanwhile, nontradable activities serve 
local needs and face local prices. As described in the introduction, these include goods and 
services like health care, dry cleaning, and restaurants. Nontradables comprise the majority of 
local employment; in the U.S. context, they are also responsible for the bulk of employment 
growth in recent years (Spence and Hlatshwayo, 2012).  
 
Using export-base theory and input-output methods, scholars have long considered that local 
tradable and nontradable employment are linked (North, 1955; Richardson, 1985). Moretti 
(2010) provides a theoretical update, describing a general equilibrium framework under which 
the national economy is comprised of a system of cities in which workers choose locations. Each 
city contains a mix of tradable and nontradable activities. A positive shock to local labor demand 
in the tradable sector will stimulate greater demand for workers in the nontradable sector. This 
will lead to new jobs for dry cleaners, medical technicians and chefs, as well as higher pay for 
workers in these sectors.2 As Moretti and Thulin (2013) outline, the extent to which expansions 
of the tradable sector produce job growth as opposed to wage growth in nontradables depends 
on the supply of housing in a location, as well as on potential migrants’ responsiveness to new 
opportunities. Locations that face strong constraints on housing supply will experience higher 
wage growth and lower job creation. Meanwhile, all else equal, a greater elasticity of migration 
will tip the balance towards larger job multipliers and weaker upward pressure on wages (Hsieh 
and Moretti 2016). On the basis that high-productivity tech work produces a larger expansion in 
local income relative to other tradables, growth in tech ought to create especially large demand 
for nontradables. 
 
Evidence on these propositions has been almost entirely focused on measuring job multipliers. 
A growing literature has documented the existence of multipliers flowing from various kinds of 
tradable activities in a range of countries (Moretti, 2010; de Blasio and Menon, 2011; Moretti and 
Thulin, 2013; Fleming and Measham, 2014; van Dijk, 2016, Frocrain and Giraud, 2017). Moretti 
(2010) finds that the addition of a manufacturing job in a local economy generates 1.6 
nontradable jobs, whereas a new tech job generates nearly 5 jobs in nontradable activities.  
 
Surprisingly, given renewed interest in this topic, there is nearly no evidence tracing the effects 
of tech or other tradable employment on the wages earned by workers in local nontradable 
activities. In the U.S. context, there is at least one strong reason to explore this channel: internal 
                                                 
2
 There are some other reasons why workers in nontradable will experience pay growth as a consequence of an 
expansion in tradable employment. One is productivity spillovers, yet logic suggests these effects ought to 
relatively minor, in that one does not expect barbers to become more productive because they are around 
computer programmers. Baumol’s (1967) ‘cost disease’ represents another potential channel, though for reasons 
that are somewhat related to the limits of productivity spillovers, one expects the influence of this to be quite 
limited in scope in terms of the kinds of nontradable work it affects. In short, physics instructors and classical 
musicians do not typify work in the nontradable sector. Meanwhile, barbers and retail clerks are not likely to 
seamlessly switch to computer programming because it pays more. We revisit this empirically later in the paper.  
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migration has slowed since 1980, a trend that cuts across a wide range of demographic features 
(Molloy et al, 2011, 2014). As a consequence, at least some of the pressure from rising demand 
ought to be pushing up the nominal wages of workers in nontradable activities. Only a few studies 
exist that investigate how high-technology employment affects the wages of workers outside of 
tech itself. Echeverri‐Carroll and Ayala (2009) and Lee and Rodriguez-Pose (2016) show that 
tech employment in U.S. metropolitan areas is associated with higher nominal wages for workers 
without college degrees; the latter also finds no association between tech and the share of local 
residents falling below the national poverty line. Studying the UK, Lee and Clarke (2017) show 
that tech employment is associated with growth in poorly paid jobs requiring relatively unskilled 
labor. A little more loosely related, Fowler and Kleit (2013) find ambiguous relationships between 
concentrations of tradable activity and the local incidence of poverty. 
 
No known work has captured how high-technology or other tradable activities affect the real 
wages for workers in local nontradable sectors. There are strong reasons why this is necessary. 
Longstanding patterns of interstate and inter-metropolitan income convergence more or less 
stopped after 1980 (Drennan et al, 1996; Moretti, 2012; Giannone, 2017). While we lack 
consensus on the deep causal explanations for this shift, one proximate cause is a skill-biased 
sorting process, whereby higher- and lower-skilled workers are increasingly concentrating in 
different locations (Shapiro, 2006, Moretti, 2013). Since 1980, high-skill workers are increasingly 
concentrated in high-productivity, high-amenity locations, where the already-elevated cost of 
housing has increased more sharply than in locations with lower shares of college graduates 
(Diamond, 2016). While living costs in high-productivity locations reduce cost-blind estimates of 
national income inequality (Moretti, 2013), they also highlight the need to consider effects of 
high-technology employment on real, not nominal wages. Ganong and Shoag (2017) illustrate 
the point by showing that while janitors working in New York City in 2010 earned nearly one third 
more in nominal pay than their counterparts in Deep South States, after adjusting for housing 
prices they earn six percent less.   
 
This should come as little surprise to a broad range of scholars and advocacy organizations long 
concerned with processes of gentrification, displacement and neighborhood change (National 
Urban Coalition, 1978; Clay, 1979; Henig, 1980; Lees et al., 2013, Zuk et al, 2015). This 
methodologically varied field of research has documented how the renewed urbanization of 
skilled workers has generated winners and losers. A clear consensus indicates that the housing 
security of lower-income workers, many of whom work in the nontradable sector of the economy, 
can be precarious in the face of sudden changes in the nature of urban housing markets.  
 
All of the preceding prompts the three research questions this paper explores: 
 
Q1: What is the relationship between local high-technology employment and the real 
wages earned by workers in nontradable industries? 
III Working paper 16  Tom Kemeny and Taner Osman 
9 
Q2: Is the relationship in Q1 specific to high-technology tradables? How does it compare 
to growth in non-high-technology tradables? 
Q3: Does the relationship between local high-technology employment and real wages for 
workers in nontradable industries depend on the elasticity of local housing supply? 
In the next section we describe our approach to answering these questions. 
3. Empirical Approach
We evaluate the relationship between local employment in the high-technology sector and the 
real wages of workers in nontradable sectors by estimating the following regression equation: 
cttcct
T
ct
NT
ct XERW   10 (1) 
where RW describes the real (local cost-deflated) wages of workers in nontradable activities, 
captured by the superscript NT, in city c and time t. Employment in high-tech tradable sectors 
is measured by ET, and X’ is a vector of relevant time-varying city characteristics. µ is a city-
specific fixed effect, whose purpose is to absorb bias from unobserved but relatively stationary 
regional features, while η is included to capture time-varying but economy-wide shocks, such 
as the Great Recession. ν is the standard random error term. The key parameter to be 
estimated is β1, measuring the effect of high-technology employment.
Applying the fixed effects estimator, Equation (1) measures how the average annual real wages 
of workers in local nontradable activities respond to changes in the level of high-technology 
employment around them. It does so while accounting for major sources of spurious correlation 
that might otherwise bias estimates. However, estimates remain vulnerable to unobserved 
localized shocks that happen to be correlated with the level of high-technology employment, and 
that also shape real wages. For a potential example of this issue, consider that several regions 
in the sample contain municipalities that pass legislation raising the minimum wage (as the cities 
of Los Angeles and Seattle did in 2015). Let’s imagine that cities with growing high-technology 
sectors are more likely to enact such laws. To the extent that shocks to minimum wages improve 
the fortunes of workers in nontradable sectors, while coinciding with growth in local high-tech 
employment, estimates of the wider effects of high-technology employment will be upwardly 
biased. To account for such bias, we follow standard practice and instrument for our key 
potentially endogenous regressor using two-stage least squares. Our instrument is a shift-share 
measure of the kind used by Bartik (1991), Ottaviano and Peri (2006) and others. In general, the 
value of such measures lies in their ability to capture the component of labor demand that stems 
from non-local sources, and which is therefore plausibly exogenous to unmeasured local shocks 
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which might generate biased estimates of the relationship of interest. In our case we aim to 
capture the exogenous component of local demand for high-technology sectors, as follows: 
 𝐸𝑐,𝑡?̂? = 𝐸𝑐 ,𝑡−1𝑇 [1 +   (𝐸𝑈𝑆,𝑡𝑇 − 𝐸𝑐,𝑡𝑇 ) − (𝐸𝑈𝑆,𝑡−1𝑇 − 𝐸𝑐,𝑡−1𝑇 )(𝐸𝑈𝑆,𝑡−1𝑇 − 𝐸𝑐,𝑡−1𝑇 ) ] (2) 
 
 
where EUS denotes national employment levels, and all other variables remain as above. 
Equation 2 arrives at the ‘expected’ level of local high-tech employment in period t by multiplying 
initial local tech tradable employment by the national growth rate for employment in the sector 
between t-1 and t. Because raw national growth rates include the region in question, and could 
therefore be driven by them, we follow Faggio and Overman (2014) in subtracting local 
employment from national employment in order to calculate the truly exogenous component of 
national growth rates between one period and the next. 
 
4. Data and Measurement 
Our primary data comes from the U.S. Bureau of Labor Statistics’ (BLS) Quarterly Census of 
Employment and Wages (QCEW). QCEW is built from State-submitted Unemployment 
Insurance (UI) records, which are then linked in order to provide a time series of employment 
and wages. Since QCEW provides information on the universe of workers covered by State UI 
programs, as well as Federal employees, its coverage is relatively comprehensive, capturing 
more than 90 percent of workers in the country. Compared to alternative data sources, QCEW 
offers several additional advantages. One is that, unlike public-use samples of the Decennial 
Census and American Community Survey, the data completely identify local areas. This means 
estimates ought to be considerably more reliable. Furthermore, since they are not self-reported, 
wage data in QCEW ought to be higher quality than those found in population Census data.  
For a given industry and location, the level of coverage in QCEW is determined by confidentiality 
policy, which seeks to ensure that reported data cannot be used to identify information on firms 
and individuals. Confidentiality issues arise in jurisdictions with a small number of employers in 
a given industrial classification. Since we focus on 4-digit NAICS sectors, and relatively densely 
populated metropolitan regions, our dataset covers in excess of 90% of the population of total 
employment in our industries of interest. Although QCEW data are available from 1990 to the 
present, we confine our analysis to the period 2001-2015, since annual data for certain control 
variables is missing prior to 2000.  
The scale of interest in this study is the metropolitan regional scale, defined in terms of economic 
rather than administrative integration. Researchers define regional economies in different ways; 
and these choices may have material consequences for the understanding of regional processes. 
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We mainly use definitions for metropolitan Core-Based Statistical Areas (CBSAs), put forth by 
the Office of Management and Budget (OMB). A metropolitan CBSA is an area containing at 
least one core urban center with at least 50,000 residents, around which are arrayed adjacent 
communities that are strongly economically and socially integrated.3  
 
4.1 Distinguishing Tradable and Nontradable Industries 
In order to capture the effects of tradable high-technology employment on the wages of workers 
in nontradable sectors, we must first distinguish tradable from nontradable industries. One key 
distinction between the two is their spatial presence. Every town needs dry cleaners, 
barbershops and offices of general practitioners. By contrast, the manufacturing of car engines 
could occur in a very limited number of locales and still satisfy a much wider geographic scope 
of demand. This intuition has been operationalized as a means of identifying the distinction 
between tradable and nontradable activities. Following Krugman (1991), we measure the level 
of geographical concentration of each 4-digit industry, using a locational Gini coefficient, given 
by the following formula: 
 𝐺𝑗 = ∑ [𝐸𝑐 𝐸𝑈𝑆⁄ − 𝐸𝑐,𝑗 𝐸𝑈𝑆,𝑗⁄ ]2𝑐  (3) 
 
where E equals the level of employment in city c for industry j. Based on this index, an industry 
which is geographically dispersed would have a Gini coefficient closer to 0, whereas one more 
concentrated would have a value closer to 1.4 We estimate Gini coefficients using 4-digit NAICS 
industries, using industry employment data from 2015. 5  The median level of industry 
concentration in 2015 is of 0.015.  
 
 
 
                                                 
3
 The labor market for a given CBSA can overlap with that of nearby CBSAs, and such adjoining CBSAs are 
combined together into Consolidated Statistical Areas (CSA) by the OMB. Limitations in data coverage for certain 
variables at the CSA scale helped to determine our focus on CBSAs as our unit of analysis. To ensure that 
findings are not biased by the exclusion of nontrade workers who may work in, but live outside of a given CBSA, 
we run our models at the CSA scale as a robustness check, albeit with an incomplete set of control variables  
4
 As with Jensen and Kletzer (2010), we opt not to adjust measures for the possibility that conc entration reflects 
the presence of a very small number of large plants – a possibility raised and addressed empirically by Ellison and 
Glaeser (1997). Because our interest is in measuring tradability, not agglomeration, concentration in any form is 
equally relevant. 
5
 Comparing Ginis produced for 2015 to those built using data from 2002, we confirm that our results are not 
driven by the year selected. 
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Table 1. Most- and least-geographically concentrated industries according to Locational 
Gini coefficients, 2015. 
Rank NAICS Industry Name Gini 
1 4821 Rail Transportation 0.9756 
2 4879 Scenic and Sightseeing Transportation, Other 0.7323 
3 3122 Tobacco Manufacturing 0.6918 
4 4861 Pipeline Transportation of Crude Oil 0.6576 
5 1132 Forest Nurseries and Gathering of Forest Products 0.6528 ⋮    
299 8111 Automotive Repair and Maintenance 0.0006 
300 4422 Home Furnishings Stores 0.0006 
301 6211 Offices of Physicians 0.0005 
302 4451 Grocery Stores 0.0005 
303 6212 Offices of Dentists 0.0002 
Note: Authors’ calculations of Gini coefficients based on 4-digit QCEW data for 2015. A full list of classified industries is 
available from the authors upon request. 
 
Table 1 presents the lowest- and highest-scoring industries, offering the opportunity to check 
these results against intuition. As is evident, the least geographically concentrated sectors are 
largely nontradable retail, while the most concentrated represent evidently tradable sectors, 
mainly those that are dependent on first-nature resource allocations that are geographically 
uneven. The most concentrated and least concentrated thirds of the distribution of Gini 
coefficients by sector conforms to basic intuition, with manufacturing sectors being amongst the 
most geographically concentrated sectors and retail sectors amongst the least.  Distinctions in 
the middle of the distribution, however, are much less clear, with tradable activities sitting cheek-
by-jowl with nontradables and a handful of ambiguous cases. To maximize the validity of our 
categorization scheme, we manually examine the ranking of industries and identify ones whose 
Gini values do not correspond to expectations regarding tradability. For instance, NAICS 4851 
Urban Transit Systems receives a Gini coefficient that places it in the immediate neighborhood 
of tradable sectors like Lime and Gypsum Product Manufacturing (NAICS 3274). And yet, while 
urban transit sustains tourism, we believe it is chiefly a locally-consumed service. In clear cases 
such as these, we follow our intuition regarding industry classification.  We additionally flag 18 
varieties of wholesale activities, which receive a very wide array of Gini values. Unclear on their 
tradability, we remove these from our analytical dataset.6 Out of a total of 302 industries, these 
procedures leave us with 149 activities that we define as tradable, and 135 sectors defined as 
nontradable.  
 
4.2 Identifying High-Technology Industries 
Next we define the subset of tradable activity that we deem to be high-technology. Just as with 
the tradability distinction, any categorization scheme will be imperfect and open to criticism. 
                                                 
6
 A full list of classified industries is available from the authors upon request.  
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Some researchers use subjective or objective judgments about the technological content of 
industry outputs, while others consider input measures, such as the presence of workers in 
scientific occupations or shares of spending on R&D.7  
 
Table 2. Level 1 High-Technology Industries 
NAICS Industry Wages 
(2015) 
3254 Pharmaceutical and medicine manufacturing  $123,811 
3341 Computer and peripheral equipment manufacturing  164,648 
3342 Communications equipment manufacturing  104,034 
3344 Semiconductor and other electronic component manufacturing  100,161 
3345 Navigational, measuring, electromedical, and control instruments 
manufacturing  
96,558 
3364 Aerospace product and parts manufacturing  96,795 
5112 Software publishers  147,045 
5179 Other telecommunications  88,624 
5191 Other information services  166,765 
5182 Data processing, hosting, and related services  98,616 
5413 Architectural, engineering, and related services  86,405 
5415 Computer systems design and related services  106,613 
5417 Scientific research-and-development services  129,553 
Note: Information drawn from Hecker (2005), Table 1. The table has been updated to reflect 2015 annual wages using 
data from QCEW. Hecker originally defines high-technology activities as including NAICS codes 5161, Internet 
Publishing and broadcasting and 5181, Internet service providers and Web search portals. In 2007, the Census Bureau 
merged these categories into code 5191, ‘Other information services,’ a category which is predominantly made up of 5-
digit NAICS code 51913, Internet Publishing and Broadcasting and Web Search Portals.  
 
We adopt an approach proposed by Hecker (2005), which puts into practice guidance from the 
BLS on what constitutes high technology industries. It considers both input and output 
dimensions, capturing the intensity of scientific, technical and engineering occupations; R&D 
employment; advanced-technology products; and the use of high-technology production 
methods.  More specifically, we use the strictest threshold defined by Hecker (2005), which he 
labels ‘Level 1’ high technology activity. Table 2 provides a list of these industries, along with 
median wages for the year 2015. Level 1 industries are those in which technology-oriented 
occupations are present at five times the overall economy-wide average – at least 24.7 percent 
of total industry employment.  
 
This definition contrasts somewhat with that taken by some closely related studies. For instance, 
Lee and Rodriguez-Pose (2016) include all three levels described by Hecker (2005), and is thus 
much more inclusive. This looser threshold includes many manufacturing industries that may 
involve technological products and processes, but that host workers less engaged in high-wage 
nonroutine work.8 We believe our stricter threshold is more appropriate given the underlying 
theory we seek to test. On the other hand, we are more inclusive than Moretti (2010), who 
considers only components of high-tech industries that involve manufacturing activities, ignoring 
                                                 
7
 For a more detailed review, interested readers are directed to Hecker (2005) 
8
 This distinction can be seen from the comparatively higher median wage levels of workers in Level 1 activities.  
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design, data processing and other industries that form an important component of contemporary 
high-technology activity in the U.S. 
 
Our key independent variable of interest in Equation (1) is 𝐸𝑐,𝑡𝑇 , which measures local high-
technology employment. Because we are interested in capturing the effects of relatively 
permanent changes in this variable, as opposed to short-run fluctuations, as in Moretti (2010), 
throughout our analysis we use 3-year moving averages of tech employment, centered on the 
current year. 
 
4.3 Measuring Real Wages 
As noted above, living costs vary strongly from one regional economy to another in the U.S., 
making both nominal incomes as well as incomes deflated using a national consumer price index 
(CPI) inadequate to the task of measuring inter-regional economic welfare. Several recent efforts 
have been made to construct consumer price indices that reflect subnational differences. Moretti 
(2013) constructs two such measures, one capturing local differences in the cost of housing, the 
other additionally reflecting local variation in non-housing costs. Meanwhile, the Federal 
government has released Regional Price Parities that cover housing and non-housing 
components for 38 large metropolitan areas in selected years (Bureau of Economic Analysis, 
2016). Given the less-than-comprehensive nature of the latter, and given broad consistency 
across approaches reported in Moretti (2013), we opt to mimic the simpler of Moretti’s methods 
to estimate our own annual local consumer price indices.  
 
According to the BLS methodology, ‘housing’ includes direct costs like rent, but also indirect 
expenditures on heating and other utilities. It is the largest single component of the national 
Consumer Price Index for All Urban Consumers (CPI-U), representing approximately 40 percent 
of the total expenditures. On this basis, and because housing markets are much more localized 
than, say, markets for food and clothing, we allow the price of housing to vary from one locality 
to the next, while our accounting of non-housing costs is derived from the national CPI-U. To 
account for the role of housing in consumer expenditures, we follow common practice in using 
rental information rather than the prices faced by home buyers. Home prices combine the value 
of a consumption good, as well as future investment expectations. As such, it is less suitable 
than rents in capturing the actual use-value of housing (Poole et al, 2005).  
 
Our local CPI measure combines location-specific information on rents, with national non-
housing prices. To measure housing prices, we use annual 50th percentile rent information from 
the Department of Housing and Urban Development. Specifically, for each county we calculate 
the average of 50th percentile rents for two- and three-bedroom dwellings. We sum to the 
regional scale using county population shares as weights. As mentioned, non-housing 
components are drawn from the CPI-U, as are annual measures of component weights. This 
allows us to estimate a local CPI as follows: 
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 𝐿𝐶𝑃𝐼𝑐,𝑡 = 𝑤𝑡𝐻 (𝐻𝑜𝑢𝑠𝑖𝑛𝑔𝑐,𝑡) + 𝑤𝑡𝑁𝐻 (𝑁𝑜𝑛ℎ𝑜𝑢𝑠𝑖𝑛𝑔) (4) 
 
where w measures the relative importance in year t by the CPI program to either housing (H) or 
nonhousing (NH) components of the CPI-U.9 We use our annual LCPI measures as deflators for 
QCEW-derived annual incomes for workers in nontradable sectors. Hence, we arrive at their real 
wages as follows: 
 𝑅𝑊𝑐 ,𝑡𝑁𝑇 = 𝑁𝑊𝑐 ,𝑡𝑁𝑇 𝐿𝐶𝑃𝐼𝑐,𝑡⁄  (5) 
 
where NW captures the average nominal wages for workers in nontradable sectors in a location 
and year. Though nominal and real wages for workers in nontradable sectors are fairly strongly 
correlated (r=0.78; p=0.000), high local prices do significantly reduce the real incomes of workers 
in selected cities. Table 3 presents the five metro CBSAs with the highest nominal and real 
incomes in 2015; comparison across these measures provides some insights into role of local 
prices. Cities with high nominal wages for workers in nontradable sectors conform to 
expectations; at least three out of five cities are heavily specialized in high-technology activities. 
But none remain at the top in terms of the cost-deflated wages earned by workers in nontradable 
sectors. Notably, Bay Area metros San Francisco and San Jose fall to 92nd and 93rd, respectively.    
 
Table 3. Cities with the highest nominal and real wages earned by workers in 
nontradable sectors, 2015 
 Workers in Nontradable Industries 
Rank Nominal Wages Real Wages 
1 San Jose-Sunnyvale-Santa Clara, CA Bloomsburg-Berwick, PA 
2 Bridgeport-Stamford-Norwalk, CT Houston-The Woodlands-Sugar Land, TX 
3 San Francisco-Oakland-Hayward, CA Pittsburgh, PA 
4 Washington-Arlington-Alexandria, DC-VA-MD-WV Midland, MI 
5 Boston-Cambridge-Newton, MA-NH Hartford-West Hartford-East Hartford, CT 
Note: Authors’ calculations based on QCEW, HUD and CPI-U data, as described in Equations 4 and 5. 
 
4.4 Measuring housing supply elasticity 
We are interested in measuring the elasticity of local housing supply as a means of capturing 
potential heterogeneity in how demand shocks for high-technology activities shape the fates of 
workers in nontradable sectors. On the one hand, less elastic housing markets ought to shift the 
balance in terms of wider effect from tech employment away from new job creation, towards 
greater pressure on nominal wages in nontradable activities. On the other, it ought to raise the 
local cost of housing, thereby reducing real wages.  
 
                                                 
9
 Historical relative component weights of the CPI-U can be obtained from the BLS, using December as the 
reference month in each year. These weights  
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We measure the elasticity of local housing supply in two very different ways. First, we use the 
2005 Wharton Regulation Index, described in detail in Gyourko et al (2008), which exploits 
survey data to measure the strength of the local growth regulatory context across a wide range 
of data on such features as zoning laws, lot requirements, affordable housing requirements and 
other factors. Cities that feature more onerous regulation, and therefore higher values of the 
Wharton Index, ought to have a more inelastic housing supply. We use metropolitan aggregates 
of these municipality-specific measures constructed by Saiz (2010).  
 
Since legislation represents only one potential driver of housing supply elasticity, we deploy a 
second measure. We consider that the availability of developable land will determine the 
responsiveness of the local housing market. The supply of locations with greater proportions of 
undevelopable land will respond more inelastically to demand shocks, whereas those with 
abundant available land will have more elastic housing supply. To measure this, we use an index 
created by Saiz (2010), using satellite data to gauge the proportion of land within 50km of an 
urban center that cannot be developed due to the presence of steep slopes, lakes and other 
natural geographical features. Since the measure captures the percent of unbuildable land in 
each metropolitan area, higher values of what we will describe herein as the Saiz Index indicate 
lower levels of housing supply elasticity. 
 
Neither of these measures perfectly captures housing supply elasticity, but each sheds light on 
different dimensions of it. Accordingly, at the metropolitan CBSA scale, these two measures are 
moderately positively correlated (r=0.23, p=0.001). In the analysis that follows, we explore the 
potential role each has in moderating the effects of changes in tech employment. 
 
4.5 Additional control variables 
One of the strengths of Equation (1), estimated on a panel of cities, lies in its ability to account 
for unmeasured stationary features of cities. Time-varying factors, on the other hand, could bias 
estimates of the relationship of interest. We include two dynamic control variables in all 
specifications. First, we measure the year- and region-specific unemployment rate, expressed 
as a percentage, using data from the BLS Local Area Unemployment Program. High levels of 
unemployment could put downward pressure on nominal wages as well as on the housing 
market. 
 
Second, using data from one percent extracts from the American Community Survey, drawn 
from IPUMS (Ruggles et al, 2015), we measure the share of non-institutional, actively employed 
workers over the age of 25 with at least a 4-year degree. Because metro-level identifiers in the 
ACS are not available between 2001 and 2004, we use geometric interpolation to impute 
educational attainment during these years. Though the existing literature is unclear on whether 
educational spillovers of the type reported in studies like Rauch (1993) and Moretti (2004) extend 
to workers in nontradable sectors, we include this measure to ensure that measures of the 
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relationship between tech employment and nontradable wages are not driven instead by 
productivity spillovers from the presence of highly-educated workers. 
 
5. Results 
5.1 Descriptive Results  
Table 4 presents descriptive statistics for key variables in the 349 metropolitan CBSAs that 
constitute our primary analytical sample, with values presented for the year 2015. The average 
urban worker in nontradable activities earns around $36,000 in nominal terms, and $26,000 in 
real terms. The average metro CBSA hosts around 14,000 workers in tradable high-technology 
activities, and 18,000 jobs in non-high-technology tradables. Over the period, which includes the 
Great Recession, local unemployment rates averaged less than six percent, and about 17 
percent of adult workers had attended at least four years of college.  
 
Table 4. Summary Statistics for Key Variables of Interest in Metropolitan CBSAs in 2015 
Variable  Mean Standard 
Deviation 
Nominal wages for workers in nontradable sectors ($) 36,077 6,104 
Real wages for workers in nontradable sectors ($) 26,364 3,811 
High-technology tradable employment  14,145 39,847 
Non-high-technology tradable employment (000s) 18,414 41,459 
Unemployment rate (%) 5.48 1.99 
Workers over 25 years old with at least 4 years of College (%) 16.98 4.58 
Wharton Regulation Index -0.18 0.72 
Saiz Index (% Unbuildable Land) 23.45 20.13 
Median Rent for 2 and 3 Bedroom Dwelling 1,029.34 241.17 
Note: Authors’ calculations based on data described in Section 4. All variables measured over 349 metropolitan CBSAs, 
except the Wharton and Saiz indices, which are time invariant and measured for 191 CBSAs.  
 
The measure of dispersion indicates considerable variation across cities, especially in terms of 
employment in tradable activities. This makes sense given the relatively heterogeneous nature 
of the metro CBSA category: although it has a minimum population threshold, it contains cities 
like New York and Los Angeles, with populations well over ten million, as well as Hinesville, 
Georgia, with just over 80,000 residents. Similarly, metropolitan areas hosting the largest 
agglomerations of high-technology activity, like San Jose, Los Angeles, and New York employ 
an order of magnitude more workers in such activities than the average city.  
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Figure 1. Variation in 2001-2015 growth rates in High-Technology Employment, Nominal 
and Real Wages, N=349 CBSAs 
 Note: Based on authors’ calculations using data described in Section 4.  
 
Crucially for our purposes, over our study period there is also meaningful temporal variation 
within cities. Figure 1 presents a box plot of growth rates over 2001-2015 for high-technology 
employment, as well as nominal and real wages. The median city expands its high-technology 
employment base by just over ten percent, and the interquartile range spans a decline of seven 
percent to an increase of just over 50 percent. In more concrete terms, the median city added 
around 200 new jobs in high technology activities over the study period, while the average city 
added 1,000. A few cities, notably Seattle, San Francisco and Houston, added tens of thousands 
of new tech jobs, while Los Angeles, Miami and Philadelphia fall considerably short of their 
boom-era peaks in the early 2000s. Nominal wages for workers in nontradable sectors rise by 
an average of over 30 percent. Among these workers, real wages increase much more modestly, 
averaging only 2.4 percent over the study period.10  
 
5.2 What is the relationship between local high-technology employment and the real 
wages of workers in nontradable sectors? 
We now present estimates of the main relationship of interest. As described in Sections 3 and 4, 
the analysis is conducted on a panel of cities, using two estimators: ordinary least squares (OLS), 
and subsequently two-stage least squares (2SLS). In each model, city fixed effects account for 
stationary unobserved heterogeneity among regional economies. Year fixed effects are included 
                                                 
10
 This is not a surprise. Stagnant real wages among American workers are a well -documented fact, especially 
after the recession (for instance, see Daly et al, 2016).  
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to capture unmeasured shocks that are uniform across cities, but which vary over time. 11 
Throughout, we include measures of unemployment and the proportion of workers with at least 
four years of college education as controls.  
 
The first research question posed in this paper asks: how do changes in local high-technology 
employment affect the wages of workers in nontradable sectors? Figure 2 summarizes key 
results regarding this question, with each row of the figure highlighting the relationship between 
tech employment and wages as estimated in a particular regression model. As long as the span 
of the 95 percent confidence interval does not cross the zero line, the coefficient of interest is 
statistically significant at a 5 percent level of confidence.12 Though our primary interest is in real 
wages, as an initial exercise, we estimate the relationship between tech employment and 
nominal wages. Model 1 presents the relationship between local high technology employment 
and the nominal wages of workers in nontradable sectors. The coefficient on tech employment 
is positive and statistically significant at a 1 percent level. Its magnitude suggests that an 
increase in local high-technology employment of 1,000 workers is associated with approximately 
an $80 increase in the annual wages of workers in nontradable sectors. In other words, though 
significant in statistical terms, given that a typical metropolitan area in our sample expanded its 
local tech sector by 200 workers over the full study period, the effect in most cities is 
substantively modest. Yet in Seattle, where tech employment increased by over 60,0000 over 
the study period, this models predicts an increase in annual nominal wages of nearly 5,000 
dollars. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                 
11
 While a Hausman specification test indicated that a random effects model generated more efficient estimates of 
the relationship of interest, actual differences between each estimated coefficient in fixed versus random effects 
models was substantively negligible. This together with the strong need to account for the potential effects of 
unobserved heterogeneity push for the fixed effects approach described in Equation (1).  
12
 Full regression tables from which these figures are drawn are included in the appendix.  
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Figure 2. Average Marginal Effects (with 95% Confidence Interval) of 1,000-Worker 
Increase in Local High-Technology Employment on Annual Wages of Workers in 
Nontradable Sectors, 2001-2015 
 
Note: Each model presents coefficient and 95% confidence interval describing the relationship between high technology 
employment and the nominal or real wages of workers in nontradable sectors. All models estimated on 2001-2015 
panel of metropolitan CBSAs. Each model includes city and year fixed effects, and additionally contains controls for 
unemployment and the share of workers with at least 4 years of college education. Estimates that cross the zero mark 
are not statistically significant at a 5% level. Models 1 and 2 are estimated using OLS. Model 3 is estimated using 2SLS 
using the shift-share instrument (Kleibergen-Paap Wald F=764.04). N for Models 1& 2=4,312; N for Model 3=3,795. 
Data sourced from QCEW, HUD and ACS as described in Section 4. Full regression table listed in the appendix, Table 
A1. 
 
Model 2 estimates the same equation, this time with nontradable real wages as the dependent 
variable. The coefficient on tech employment remains positive and significant at a 1 percent level, 
but its size has diminished markedly as compared with nominal wages. This fits with the initial 
intuition, suggesting that although growth in tech employment raises the raw money wages for 
workers in nontradable activities, their value diminishes as growing demand also prompts 
expansion in the local cost of living. The coefficient in Model 2 is around 17 dollars – almost one-
fifth the size of its counterpart for nominal wages.  
 
To account for potential bias from unobserved shocks to localities that are both correlated with 
changes in tech employment and also related to the real wages for workers in nontradable 
sectors, Model 3 instruments for high-tech employment using the shift-share measure described 
in Equation 2, using the 2SLS estimator. The instrument passes tests of under- and weak-
identification. We cannot formally test for its exogeneity, since the equation is exactly identified. 
Second-stage results closely resemble those reported in Model 2 though the coefficient in Model 
3 is slightly larger, as is the confidence interval. The consistency across Models 2 and 3 suggests 
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that the positive relationship between local tech employment and wages for workers in 
nontradable activities is not driven by unobserved shocks. Since the instrument used in Model 3 
strips away location-specific unobserved factors, we are left with an estimate whose causal 
significance is clearer: it suggests that expansions in local tech employment exert an 
independent, positive (though modest) effect on the real wages of workers in nontradable sectors.  
 
We confirm the robustness of these findings in a few ways. First, we get meaningfully 
comparable results when additionally estimating these models in log-log and log-linear functional 
forms. Results remain consistent when we replace our count-measure of high-technology 
employment with one that instead describes the proportion of tech jobs in the local economy. To 
check that results do not depend on our use of 3-year moving averages for both our dependent 
variable and our key independent variable, we also estimate models using unadjusted single-
year values. These results are materially consistent with those we report in the paper. Given that 
there are a handful of regions whose levels and growth in tech employment over the study period 
are quite different from the average, we also explore the robustness of our results to the 
exclusion of these outliers. We estimate a succession of models in which San Jose, San 
Francisco, Seattle, Los Angeles, as well as all possible combinations of these regions are 
removed from the analytical sample. Their inclusion does not fundamentally shape estimates of 
the relationship of interest.  
 
On the intuition that workers in nontradable sectors might be priced out of metropolitan areas 
into adjacent, and presumably more affordable ‘micropolitan’ CBSAs, we also re-estimate each 
of the models discussed thus far defining regional economies according to OMB definitions for 
Consolidated Statistical Areas (CSAs), where available, and otherwise using metropolitan 
CBSAs. Perfect analogues of Models 1-3 for this sample are not possible given our inability to 
perfectly measure unemployment and education levels in micropolitan areas that lie within CSA 
boundaries. However, for both kinds of samples we can compare estimates of a version of 
Equation 1 that lacks these controls, but which still includes year and city fixed effects. Doing so, 
we find that the real wage effects of high-technology employment across these two samples are 
each positive and statistically significant at a 1 percent level, with magnitudes that are nearly 
indistinguishable.13 
 
As a further robustness check, we explore the likelihood that the relationship of interest is driven 
by Baumol’s ‘cost disease’ (1967), instead of by derived-demand explanations that form the 
basis of the hypotheses. Observing that the wages of workers in particular nontradable sectors 
like education have risen despite major changes in productivity, Baumol suggests that teacher 
pay must be indexed to rates of wage growth in productive sectors, as a means of ensuring that 
teachers do not defect to activities where pay and productivity are rising. To the extent that this 
mechanism is in operation, in the present context it is essential to note that not all workers are 
                                                 
13
 Figure A1 in the appendix presents these results. 
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equally likely to switch to the productive sector. The average barber, for example, is a lot less 
likely than a physics teacher to switch to software engineering. To account for potential bias from 
this source, we recode classic nontradable cost-disease industries – those in education, health 
care, and the arts – to the ‘indeterminate’ category. Having excluded workers in these industries, 
we then re-estimate Models 1-3 on our restricted subsample of nontradables.14 Results strongly 
resemble those generated for the full complement of nontradable activities, with significant, 
positive, albeit relatively modest impacts of tech employment on both nominal and real 
nontradable wages. These results suggest that the cost disease is not the primary explanation 
of the relationship of interest. Findings remain consistent with the hypothesized derived-demand 
explanation. 
 
5.3 Is high-technology employment special? 
Next we consider the second research question: the extent to which tech has a unique 
relationship with nontradable real wages when compared with other tradable activities. In 2015, 
the average worker in tech activities earned 42 percent more than their counterpart in non-tech 
tradables. This premium is consistent across the full study period. Consequently, one might 
expect larger benefits for workers in nontradable sectors flowing from tech as opposed to non-
tech tradables. To explore whether this is the case, we re-estimate Equation 1, this time 
substituting high-tech employment for employment among activities that are tradable but not part 
of the BLS definition of high-technology sectors as described above.  
 
Figure 3 reports coefficients for non-high-technology tradable employment regressed on the 
nominal and real wages of workers in nontradable sectors, respectively. The estimate for Model 
5 indicates that tradable non-high-technology employment is not significantly related to the 
nominal wages earned by workers in nontradables. Model 6 suggests that employment growth 
in non-tech tradables is also unrelated to changes in their real wages. We interpret this to mean 
that high-technology employment is indeed distinct from the average non-tech tradable activity, 
in terms of its effects on the wages earned in the nontradable sector. While tradable tech 
activities stimulate growth in nominal and real wages for workers in nontradable activities, 
tradable non-tech employment does not.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                 
  
14
 We disinclude all 4-digit NAICS sectors within NAICS 61 (Education services), and 62 (Health care and social  
     assistance), as well as 7111 (Performing arts companies), 7115 (Independent artists, writers, and performers),  
     and 8122 (Death care services). Full regression results for research questions 1-3 on the subsample of 
     nontradable activities in which these sectors are removed are presented in the appendix, Table A2.  
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Figure 3. Average Marginal Effects (with 95% Confidence Interval) of 1,000-Worker 
Increase in Local Non-High-Technology Tradable Employment on Annual Wages of 
Workers in Nontradable Sectors, 2001-2015 
 
Note: Each model presents coefficient and 95% confidence interval describing the relationship between non-high 
technology tradable employment and the nominal or real wages of workers in nontradable sectors. All models estimated 
on 2001-2015 panel of metropolitan CBSAs. Each model includes city and year fixed effects, and additionally contains 
controls for unemployment and the share of workers with at least 4 years of college education. Estimates that cross the 
zero mark are not statistically significant at a 5% level. Models 1 and 2 are estimated using OLS. Model 3 is estimated 
using 2SLS using the shift-share instrument. N for Models 1& 2=4,312. Data sourced from QCEW, HUD and ACS. Full 
regression table listed in the appendix, Table A1. 
 
5.4 Housing supply elasticity 
Our third research question revisits the primary relationship of interest, but considers that 
estimates for the average city conceal heterogeneity in terms of how wages respond to changes 
in high tech employment. Specifically, we consider that workers living in cities in which the supply 
of housing is more inelastic will be more negatively affected by high-technology employment, as 
nominal wage gains are eroded by growth in local prices. Meanwhile, in cities where the supply 
of housing reacts more frictionlessly to demand shocks, real gains to workers in nontradable 
activities are likely to be more substantial. As described above, we test this idea using two 
different measures of housing supply elasticity: the Wharton index of land use regulation, and 
Saiz’s measure of the proportion of developable land.  
 
III Working paper 16                                                               Tom Kemeny and Taner Osman 
 
 24 
Figure 4. Predictive Margins for Real Wages of Workers in Nontradable Sectors in 
Response to Change in High-Technology Employment, by Levels of Land Use 
Regulation 
 
Note: Model estimated on a 2001-2015 panel of metropolitan CBSAs (N=2,483). The model includes city and year fixed 
effects, and additionally contains controls for unemployment and the share of workers with at least 4 years of college 
education. Interaction term between high-technology employment and the Wharton index is significant at a 1 percent 
level. Overall adjusted R2=0.93. Data sourced from QCEW, HUD and ACS. Full regression table listed in the appendix, 
Table A3. 
 
We re-estimate Equation 1, adding a linear interaction term between high-technology 
employment and either the Wharton or Saiz index. Since these latter measures are time-invariant, 
the coefficient on each measure of housing supply elasticity alone drops out of the model. Our 
interest lies in interpreting the significance of the interaction term, and the joint meaning of the 
coefficients on tech employment and the linear interaction term.   
 
Table 5. Marginal Effects for Real Wages of Workers in Nontradable Sectors in 
Response to Change in High-Technology Employment, by Levels of Two Measures of 
Housing Supply Elasticity 
   Marginal Effects 
 25th  
Percentile 
50th  
Percentile 
75th  
Percentile 
95th  
Percentile 
Land Use Restrictiveness Index (Wharton) 52.69*** 36.41*** 16.39*** -25.26** 
 (12.08) (8.18) (5.08) (11.76) 
Percent Unbuildable Land (Saiz Index) 35.64*** 29.36*** 18.06*** -0.14 
 (9.39) (7.61) (5.30) (6.83) 
Note: Models estimated on 2001-2015 panel of metropolitan CBSAs. Each model includes city and year fixed effects, 
and additionally contains controls for unemployment and the share of workers with at least 4 years of college education. 
III Working paper 16                                                               Tom Kemeny and Taner Osman 
 
 25 
N=2,483. The interaction terms using the Wharton and Saiz indices are significant at a 1 and 5 percent level, 
respectively. Overall adjusted in each model is R2=0.93. Data sourced from QCEW, HUD and ACS. Full regression 
table listed in the appendix, Table A3. 
 
Using these two very different indices, estimates produced regarding the moderating role of 
housing supply elasticity are strongly consistent. Using either the Wharton and Saiz indices, the 
coefficient on tech employment remains positive, while the interaction term is negative and 
significant at a minimum of a 5 percent level.15 Confirming intuition, this suggests that gains from 
tech employment in the real wages of workers in nontradable activities are eroded more strongly 
in cities featuring more inelastic housing markets. Figure 4 plots predicted margins at the 25 th, 
50th, 75th and 95th percentile of the Wharton index. Slopes for levels below the 95th percentile 
are positive, whereas from the 95th percentile and higher, they turn sharply negative. Table 5 
presents marginal effects at the same specific levels of housing supply elasticity for both 
Wharton and Saiz indices. What is clear from both is that, for the majority of cities, gains in tech 
employment confer real wage gains for workers in nontradables, and the size of these gains 
increase with rising elasticity. Using the Wharton index, workers in the most inelastic housing 
markets experience losses, while with the Saiz index, the relationship is essentially zero. On the 
other hand, workers in nontradables who live in cities where the housing supply is highly elastic 
are considerably more strongly rewarded by growth in the tech sector. While each index only 
imperfectly captures housing supply elasticity, the fact that we see the same relationship in both 
strongly suggests that housing supply elasticity moderates the wider benefits generated by high-
technology employment. 
 
6. Conclusion 
This paper set out to explore the relationship between local high-technology employment and 
the real wages of workers in nontradable sectors. Scholars have long considered the direct 
impacts of high-technology and other kinds of specialization on regional economic performance. 
Others have examined indirect effects, but this work has largely concentrated on job creation as 
an outcome, despite recent theory identifying mechanisms through which tradable jobs in an 
urban labor market can affect local nontradable wages. Most narrowly, this paper contributes to 
recent efforts to explore this channel empirically. It does so in several ways, most notably by 
considering how employment growth in tech might shape not only nominal wages, but wages 
adjusted for local living costs.  
 
We argue that accounting for living costs is essential to determining the wider economic impacts 
of high technology employment. While high- and low-skill American workers are increasingly 
sorting into cities with different cost structures, concentrations of skilled tech workers still depend 
upon services provided by workers in nontradable sectors. And while the paychecks in the 
pockets of barbers and phlebotomists in tech agglomerations might be larger as a consequence, 
                                                 
15
 Full regression results for models in Section 5.4 are presented in appendix, Table A3. 
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housing and other rising costs might make these workers considerable worse off than their 
counterparts elsewhere.  
 
Based on the estimation approach, high-quality data, and breadth of coverage, we believe this 
paper offers strong evidence suggesting that, for the average metropolitan area in the United 
States, growth in high-technology employment offers statistically significant but substantively 
very modest real wage benefits for workers in nontradable activities. We find that a 1,000 job 
increase in local high-technology employment is associated with just under a $20 increase in the 
annual real wages of workers in nontradables. The nature of the relationship is supported by 
evidence that accounts for potential bias from unobserved shocks. These results must be read 
against a real experience of high-technology expansion over the study period in which most 
cities add limited quantities of tech jobs. It should also be compared to our estimate of 
approximately 2 jobs in nontradables created for each new job in tech, a figure broadly in line 
with recent evidence from van Dijk (2016). This suggests that tech’s local effects are felt more 
strongly through job creation than through real improvements in the wages of workers in 
nontradables.  
 
At the same time, the reputed ills of tech do not seem apparent, at least when we do not 
distinguish between Seattle’s tech economy and that found in Muskegon, Michigan. Our results 
also show that the positive relationship we identify for tech does not extend to the collection of 
tradable but not high-technology industries. The reason for this is likely that, on average, other 
tradable activities pay lower salaries. This does not indicate that specific non-tech tradables 
need not have a similar relationship to real nontradable wages. We also probe the question of 
heterogeneity hinted at in our main results. Specifically, we find that the association between 
high-technology employment and nontradable real wages depends on the elasticity of a region’s 
housing supply. In highly elastic markets, workers in nontradables reap higher rewards from tech 
employment. By contrast, in markets that are strongly constrained by building regulation or 
natural limits to construction, tech employment actually reduces the real wages of workers in 
nontradables. The rate of living cost increases in such markets outstrips any benefits accrued 
through positive nominal wage effects. To put it another way, wider gains from tech employment 
in such locations are redistributed from workers in nontradables to incumbent landowners. 
 
These differentiated results offer some complement to sociological accounts of the pains of 
neighborhood change. Results confirm that the wider effects of tech employment in tight housing 
markets can be negative at the regional scale. But they also suggest that the impact of high-
technology employment varies considerably across cities, with evidence of a positive, albeit 
modest aggregate effect on the real wages of workers in nontradables. These findings also add 
to a growing body of research identifying a key role for land use regulations in shaping the 
welfare of communities within regions. While regions can expend great effort both to attract and 
develop the tech industry within their communities, with the objective of raising local incomes, 
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there should be a greater recognition that real incomes are shaped not only by explicit economic 
development efforts, but indirect policies, such as land use regulations.   
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Appendix 
    
Table A1: Panel Estimates of Relationship between Local Tradable Employment and 
Annual Wages for Workers in Nontradable Sectors, 2001-2015 
 (1) (2) (3) (5) (6) 
 Nominal 
Wages 
OLS 
Real 
Wages 
OLS 
Real 
Wages 
2SLS 
Nominal 
Wages 
Real 
Wages 
(OLS) 
       
High-Technology Employment (000s) 77.13*** 17.21*** 21.18**   
 (6.32) (5.156) (7.787)   
    -6.412 1.086 
Non-High-Tech Tradable Employment 
(000s) 
   (3.529) (2.828) 
 
      
Unemployment Rate (%) -287.1*** -346.4*** -347.6*** -308.4*** -349.8*** 
 (18.95) (15.45)   (18.12) (19.34) (15.50) 
      
Workers with at least 4 years College (%) 19.37 -4.904 -5.691 19.26 -4.285 
 (17.79) (14.51) (13.71) (18.15) (14.55) 
      
Kleibergen-Paap Wald F   764.04   
Adjusted R2 0.96 0.93 --  0.963 0.928 
N 4,132 4,132 3,795 4,132  4,132 
Note: Standard errors in parentheses. *, **, and *** denote significance at the 10, 5, and 1 percentage level, 
respectively. All models estimated on 2001-2015 panel of metropolitan CBSAs. Each model includes city and year fixed 
effects.  
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Table A2. Panel Estimates of Relationship between Local Tradable Employment and Annual Wages for Workers 
in Nontradable Sectors, excluding cost disease sectors 2001-2015 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) 
 Nominal 
Wages 
(OLS) 
Real 
Wages 
(OLS) 
Real 
Wages 
(2SLS) 
Nominal 
Wages 
(OLS) 
Real 
Wages 
(OLS) 
Real 
Wages 
(OLS) 
Real 
Wages 
(OLS) 
        
High-Technology Employment (000s) 90.98*** 22.84*** 24.89**   41.77*** 33.30*** 
 (6.56) (5.23) (7.68)   (12.25) (7.59) 
        
Unemployment Rate (%) -369*** -402*** -404*** -403*** -406*** -412*** -412*** 
 (19.65) (15.66) (19.45) (19.34) (15.67) (19.15) (19.14) 
        
Workers with at least 4 years College (%) 27.68 1.872 2.593 27.22 4.716 53.52* 54.16* 
 (18.45) (14.70) (14.15) (19.09) (15.47) (23.01) (22.98) 
        
Non-high-technology Tradable Employment (000s)    -14.1*** 5.17*   
    (3.08) (2.49)   
        
High-Technology Employment (000s) * Saiz Index      -57.23*  
      (26.54)  
        
High-Technology Employment (000s) * Wharton 
Index 
      -28.65** 
       (9.67) 
City FEs Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Year FEs Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
N 4132 4132 3795 3795 3795 2304 2304 
adj. R-sq 0.97 0.94 -- 0.97 0.94 0.94 0.94 
Note: Standard errors in parentheses. *, **, and *** denote significance at the 10, 5, and 1 percentage level, respectively. All models estimated on 2001-
2015 panel of metropolitan CBSAs. 
  
III Working paper 16                                                               Tom Kemeny and Taner Osman 
 
 35 
Table A3: Panel Estimates of Relationship between Local High-Technology 
Employment, Housing Supply Elasticity, and Annual Wages for Workers in Nontradable 
Sectors, 2001-2015 
 (2) (1) 
 Wharton Saiz  
 Interaction Interaction 
   
High-Technology Employment (000s) 29.21*** 40.67*** 
 (6.709) (10.93) 
   
High-Technology Employment (000s) * Wharton Index -31.30***  
 (8.693)  
   
High-Technology Employment (000s) * Saiz Index  -62.79** 
  (22.13) 
   
Unemployment Rate (%) -354.2*** -355.5*** 
 (18.94) (18.95) 
   
Workers with at least 4 years College (%) 43.98* 42.89 
 (21.93) (21.95) 
N 2,483 2,483 
Adjusted R2 0.929 0.929 
Note: Standard errors in parentheses. *, **, and *** denote significance at the 10, 5, and 1 percentage level, 
respectively. All models estimated on 2001-2015 panel of metropolitan CBSAs. Each model includes city and year fixed 
effects.  
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Figure A1. Comparing CBSA sample and CSA+ sample: Average Marginal Effects (with 
95% Confidence Interval) of 1,000-Worker Increase in Local Non-High-Technology 
Tradable Employment on Annual Wages of Workers in Nontradable Sectors, 2001-2015;  
 
Note: Each model presents coefficient and 95% confidence interval describing the relationship between high technology 
employment and the real wages of workers in nontradable sectors. One model estimated on 349 metro CBSAs 
(N=4,132). The second model estimated on 275 CSAs and metro CBSAs (N=3,207). Each model includes city and year 
fixed effects. Estimates that cross the zero mark are not statistically significant at a 5% level.  Data sourced from QCEW, 
HUD and ACS.  
 
 
